Did App Privacy Improve After the GDPR? by Momen, Nurul et al.
Northumbria Research Link
Citation: Momen, Nurul, Hatamian, Majid and Fritsch, Lothar (2019) Did App Privacy Improve After the 
GDPR? IEEE Security & Privacy, 17 (6). pp. 10-20. ISSN 1540-799 
Published by: IEEE
URL: https://doi.org/10.1109/MSEC.2019.2938445 <https://doi.org/10.1109/MSEC.2019.2938445>
This  version  was  downloaded  from  Northumbria  Research  Link: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/id/eprint/45542/
Northumbria University has developed Northumbria Research Link (NRL) to enable users to access 
the University’s research output. Copyright © and moral rights for items on NRL are retained by the 
individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  Single copies of full items can be reproduced, 
displayed or performed, and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or 
study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided the authors, 
title and full bibliographic details are given, as well as a hyperlink and/or URL to the original metadata 
page. The content must not be changed in any way. Full items must not be sold commercially in any  
format or medium without formal permission of the copyright holder.  The full policy is available online: 
http://nrl.northumbria.ac.uk/pol  i cies.html  
This  document  may differ  from the  final,  published version of  the research  and has been made 
available online in accordance with publisher policies. To read and/or cite from the published version 
of the research, please visit the publisher’s website (a subscription may be required.)
                        
1
Did app privacy improve after GDPR?
Nurul Momen, Majid Hatamian (IEEE Member), Lothar Fritsch
Abstract—What are the effects of the GDPR on consumer apps? This article presents an analysis of app behavior before and after the
regulatory change in data protection in Europe. Based on long-term data collection, we present differences in app permission use and
expressed user concerns and discuss their implications. In May 2018, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) changed the
data protection obligations of the information industry with the European Union users substantially. One should expect to find changes
in code, program behavior and data collection activities. To investigate this expectation, we analyzed data about Android apps request
and use of permissions to access sensitive group of data on smartphones, and collected user reviews. Our data shows an overall
reduction of both permissions used and of expressed user concern. However, in some areas apps have increased access or user
complaints while in addition, many apps carry with them several unused access privileges.
Index Terms—Apps, data protection, GDPR, information privacy, survey.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
In May 2018, stronger regulation of the processing of per-
sonal data became law in the European Union, known as
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [1]. The
expected effect of the regulation was better protection of
personal data, increased transparency of collection and pro-
cessing, and stronger intervention rights of data subjects,
with some authors claiming that GDPR will change the
world, or at least that of data protection regulation [2]. The
GDPR had a two-year (2016–2018) implementation period
that followed four years of preparation. At the time of this
writing, in November 2019, one and a half year have passed
since the implementation of GDPR.
Has GDPR had an effect on consumer software, then?
Has the world of code changed, too? Did the GDPR have
a measurable effect on mobile apps behavior? How should
such a change in behavior be measured?
In our study, we decided to use two indicators for
measurement: Android dangerous permission [3] privileges
and user feedback from the Google Play app market. We
collected data from smartphones with an installed app set
for months before GDPR implementation on May 25, 2018,
and months after that date. Both Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 show how
the data collection was organized. The set of 50 apps in our
observation is listed in Fig. 3.
We ran a long-term data collection about Android apps
use of permission privileges through the Android operating
system permissions mechanism. We focused on the so-
called dangerous permissions [3], a group of access privileges
defined as sensitive by Android developers, as they may
have an effect on the users sensitive data that regulate access
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to location, contacts, phone log, sensors, and other data
sources. We monitored app permission access request data
in March 2017. To compare, we installed a subset of the post-
GDPR version of the respective apps in December 2018 and
ran a one-week data collection campaign as highlighted in
both Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. The data collection was done with the
A-ware data capture tool described in [4], [5]. The data is
stored in an online collection database [6].
Figure 2 shows how we collected three different types
of data from the Google Play server, from the app manifest
and from observing apps at run time.
Permissions are Androids’ access control mechanisms
that regulate an apps’ access to various system resources. To
retrieve data protected by dangerous permissions, the app
code contains a declaration of the permissions requested by
the app programmers in its manifesto. Upon the apps’ first
presentation to the operating system, the user of the device
is prompted to confirm the apps’ permission request. If the
user consents, the app stores this granted permission and
then can use it without user interaction to access resources.
Apps do not face any restriction in terms of the period,
frequency or amount of data extracted, except for the latest
version (Android 9.0—Pie) that has introduced some granu-
lar conditions for permission access recently. The permission
declaration in the app is, therefore, an indication of the
apps’ likely data access (however there may be effects that
obfuscate this interpretation, see Section 1.3). To evaluate the
extent of access, we logged and archived app permission
use at the operating system level with the A-ware logging
tool. The logs were collected for further analysis. From these
logs, we obtained data about the apps’ actual usage of its
permissions.
User feedback is the second indicator of app change. Such
feedback sometimes comprises valuable information regard-
ing different aspects of apps ranging from user-friendliness
to privacy aspects. Thus, based on our previous study [7],
we collected 121,991 and 130,065 user reviews of the 50 most
downloaded apps within five app sets on the Google Play
app market for the pre- and post-GDPR period, respectively.
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Fig. 1. Data was collected with an approximate 6-months quarantine before and after GDPR implementation. App manifest data (list of required
permissions) and user concern data (retrieved from Google Plays’ server) were collected after app permission use profiling. Quarantining ensured
that app producers had time to adapt apps to GDPR between the two data collection periods.
machine learning (ML) techniques to collected user reviews
and our approach was focused on vocabulary referring to
privacy threats. The resulting set of threats for the two data
collection periods is an indicator of end users’ concerns and
experiences before and after the adoption of the GDPR.
Before we focus on the data analysis, we discuss the
expected impact of the GDPR on apps and their permission
use.
1.1 Permissions and the GDPR
One would expect that many of the aspects of GDPR are
now implemented and this should show in the app code.
Such expectation should be reflected in the software be-
cause of the enforcement of expensive violation sanctions.
In particular, mobile apps have been known to extract large
amounts of personal data [8], [9]. In theory, the observed
data collection and processing behavior of apps should have
adapted to the GDPR either (or both) by improved privacy
statements and consent collection interfaces or through soft-
ware updates that changed functionality. We target function-
ality when we measure permission usage.
The GDPR places various requirements on personal data
collection and processing. Some of these requirements are
discussed below.
The principle of purpose specification requires any process-
ing of personal data to be bound to a declared purpose.
Article 5-1(b) of the GDPR states that personal data shall
be collected for specified, explicit and legitimate purposes and not
further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those
purposes; further processing for archiving purposes in the public
interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical
purposes shall, in accordance with Article 89(1), not be considered
to be incompatible with the initial purposes (“purpose limitation”)
[1]. The choice of requested permissions should, therefore,
correlate to the app functionality and the privacy policy.
Moreover, the use of permission should be bound to its
propose—for example, the MICROPHONE permission can be
used for purpose A only, not for purpose B.
The principle of data minimization requires personal data
processing to be reduced to the minimum amount necessary
to fulfill the app purpose. Article 5-1(c) of the GDPR states
that personal data shall be adequate, relevant and limited to
what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are
processed (“data minimization”) [1]. Thus, the use of permis-
sions should be restricted to the minimum needed to deliver
a transaction with the app.
The principle of transparency requires all personal data
processing to be clearly transparent to the data subject.
Article 5-1(a) of the GDPR states that personal data shall be
processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner in relation
to the data subject (“lawfulness, fairness, and transparency”) [1].
For permissions, transparency means that information about
the kind of data accessed, the frequency and the amount
of data extracted should be available. Currently, only one-
stop consent for any amount of permission-based access is
provided.
Data protection by design is a principle that requires apps
to respect privacy from the start, with safe configurations
and minimum necessary data processing. Article 25-2 of
the GDPR highlights the requirement: the controller shall
implement appropriate technical and organisational measures for
ensuring that, by default, only personal data which are necessary
for each specific purpose of the processing are processed. That
obligation applies to the amount of personal data collected, the
extent of their processing, the period of their storage and their
accessibility. In particular, such measures shall ensure that by
default personal data are not made accessible without the individ-
uals’ intervention to an indefinite number of natural persons [1].
The implications for permission use are that the minimum
number of permissions should be requested and a lower
number of actual permissions should be used in such ways
that they reduce the loss of personal data by default.
Data Protection Impact Assessment, which is mandatory
for high-risk or high-magnitude data processing or han-
dling of sensitive personal data may uncover risks for data
subject privacy. Article 35-7(a–d) of the GDPR elaborates
on the criteria: the assessment shall contain at least: (a) a
systematic description of the envisaged processing operations and
the purposes of the processing, including, where applicable, the
legitimate interest pursued by the controller; (b) an assessment of
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Fig. 2. An overview of the data collection methods used. App manifest data and user concern data were retrieved from Google Play’s server,
respectively extracted from app manifests and user feedback forum. App use data were observed with the A-Ware tool installed on smartphones.
relation to the purposes; (c) an assessment of the risks to the rights
and freedoms of data subjects referred to in paragraph 1 (Art. 35-
1); and (d) the measures envisaged to address the risks, including
safeguards, security measures and mechanisms to ensure the
protection of personal data and to demonstrate compliance with
this Regulation taking into account the rights and legitimate
interests of data subjects and other persons concerned [1]. GDPR
compliance activities may uncover such risks materializing
as a consequence of excessively broad or deep permission
use in apps. Consequently, risk reduction will decrease the
number of permissions consumed and shown.
Freely given and unambiguous data subject consent is a
precondition for lawful data processing. Article 7-2 of the
GDPR emphasizes this aspect: If the data subjects’ consent is
given in the context of a written declaration which also concerns
other matters, the request for consent shall be presented in a
manner which is clearly distinguishable from the other matters,
in an intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and plain
language. Any part of such a declaration which constitutes an
infringement of this Regulation shall not be binding [1]. Freely
given consent would require permission to access data to
be bound to a declared purpose, confirmed by the data
subject through consent. Therefore, one can expect post-
GDPR apps to change behavior so that permissions will not
be confirmed in bulk from the start, but in more selective
and interactive ways.
The right to withdraw consent is also an important right
for implementing individual privacy preferences. Histori-
cally, an app would just show permissions with a binary
(accept/decline) consent collection form to the data subject
which was addressed in newer Android versions (6.0–9.0).
Now the right to withdraw consent is preserved in these
versions and therefore they comply with Article 7-3: The data
subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any
time. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness
of processing based on consent before its withdrawal. Prior to
giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof. It shall
be as easy to withdraw as to give consent [1]. However, the
spirit of freely given and revocable consent is yet to be fully
captured, because there is no permission usage monitoring
mechanism in the user interface. Such unavailability could
influence individual decisions on consents given earlier.
Thus, permission usage monitoring efforts can potentially
support informed decision-making.
Software changes in reaction to the new regulation are
hard to predict, though. While it has recently been argued
that the inertia of regulation adaption that is caused by
national exceptions and local adaption of EU data protection
traditions predating the GDPR [2], we believe that the
threat of fines and public exposure actually has created a
momentum to improve software, at least when provided by
professional software firms or service providers. However,
another argument is presented in [10]: the reaction of soft-
ware vendors to regulation must not always be in support
of regulation. As software can be updated very quickly,
and standard practices can be established quicker than new
regulations can be enforced, there is a risk that software may
intentionally use loopholes, camouflage its compliance with
regulation, and pursue its own agenda.
1.2 Expecting changes in apps
Based on our discussion of potential GDPR effects on soft-
ware behavior, we formulate these hypotheses:
H1 Reduced permission declaration: Code should
have been cleaned up and data collection min-
imized, which should be visible in a reduced
number of dangerous permission declared.
H2 Reduced permission use: A lower permission
use frequency should occur. As the user pro-
vides consent in a granular fashion, permissions
should be used more selectively, based on apps’
real functionality.
4
H3 Reduced user concern: User feedback should
consequently show reduced worries about pri-
vacy threats.
Before we proceed to the analysis of the collected data,
we discuss the constraints and limitations of our data col-
lection project.
1.3 Limitations of chosen approach
Several difficulties arise when interpreting the intention and
the relevance of permission use in apps. While our captured
data measures static permission declaration and actual use
during run-time, it will be difficult to estimate the reasons
for and intentions behind the particular permission use.
Therefore, not all permission uses may relate to an actual
privacy risk.
Simple programming issues, such as re-used code ask-
ing for too many permissions or code that has not been
cleaned up from testing could be one issue that affects our
measurements. Program libraries have been observed as a
possible source for excessive use of permissions. In [11], a
growing consumption of permissions is identified that is
imported through advertising libraries. The intentions of
the app programmers and the library programmers may
diverge in some cases. For the interpretation of permission
use before and after the GDPR, we can only speculate about
the possibility that permission-hungry libraries had actually
been removed from the app code, since there is not an
updated survey for [11] available. In addition, our data
was collected on idle smartphones that were not actively
used, thus we measured only the app activity that took
place without user interaction. In later experiments with
app interaction, we got the impression that some apps will
collect approval for permission use after a certain time
period or if certain conditions occur. Possibly, permissions
have not yet been asked for by idling apps.
We point out that while we measured apps showing
their permissions credentials to the operating system, we
did not observe whether they access or collect data. Neither
did we consider personal information extraction, transfer to
connected online servers or processing done at such servers.
There are practical limitations to data captured with
respect to the control of context variables. Many apps are
highly interactive. Social media and news-related apps, as
well as advertising, are controlled by external activities.
Apps may be updated during data collection, thus auto-
matic updating has to be turned off during the measure-
ment. However, Google Play enforces updates after a while,
which limits measurement campaigns to shorter period. Our
app sample was for the sake of stable conditions installed to
the devices, activated and if necessary personalized with
an artificial account. The apps were then left as they were
and measured with no user interaction. Through this, we
aimed to exclude interaction bias and the influence of social
network activities, which both may change app behavior.
For user review analysis, we implemented and followed
a machine learning-based scheme to mine user reviews for
finding privacy relevant complaints. It is important to note
that, the overall usefulness of such a technique is dependent
on both (1) how well it understands the user reviews and (2)
how truthful those user reviews are. Our approach mainly
covers the former, and still, there is little discussion of the
accuracy, veracity, and clarity of the reviews because this is
generally out of our control.
We would like to highlight that performing a compre-
hensive app privacy analysis for both the pre- and post-
GDPR periods is not an easy task. This is mainly because
of the lack of historic app data (manifest, permission usage
and user reviews) which are not fully available for the pre-
GDPR period. However, we were able to partially correlate
our app data sets obtained from separate studies conducted
by two research groups (in Sweden and Germany). Never-
theless, we would like to emphasize that there is a mismatch
between the studied app categories in user reviews analysis
and app permission usage analysis (only Health & Fitness
and Music & Audio app categories overlapping).
Reproducibility is difficult in this setting. Apps get up-
dated, often several times per week. Most apps receive
messages from their background services that impact their
behavior. Thus it will be challenging to re-create the exact
same test setting.
The app sets composition will have an impact on
the result. The current app set is mainly taken from the
globally most downloaded apps on the Google Play app
market. Those apps reflect a global, English-speaking con-
sumer community with an expected over representation in
English-speaking countries. Therefore, the data may contain
an implicit bias towards non-EU privacy regulation and atti-
tudes. A focused data set representing apps from European
vendors, available in EU languages may show different
results. We also acknowledge that the chosen app set for
permission analysis is a very small subset of the millions
of apps available in various app markets. However, it is
plausible to assume that choosing globally popular apps
allows correlation of privacy expectations of a vast user
base, and with industry-standard practice.
2 CHANGES IN PERMISSION DECLARATION AND
USAGE PATTERNS
App developers are required to define permissions needed
for their apps to function in the app permission manifest.
Based on the permission request level [12], users have to
consent to data access by granting or rejecting permission
requests. Therefore, our study looks for the changes in
the developers permission declarations before and after the
adoption of the GDPR. Previous studies showed that app
developers usually request more permissions than needed
for the proper functionality of their apps [4], [8], [9], [13].
The number of declared permissions has historically risen
over time [11]. We can examine hypothesis H1 by comparing
the extent to which the GDPR had a measurable effect on the
permissions requested in the app manifest.
2.1 Permissions: Manifest Changes
This subsection investigates hypothesis H1. We collected the
permission manifest for the 50 most-used apps across five
app categories on the Google Play app market in November
2017. Our analysis mainly focuses on those permissions
defined by Android as dangerous permission requests. Fig-











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(b) Case II: Permission usage analysis
Fig. 3. A visualization of pre-post-GDPR differences in permission requests and permission access pattern during run-time. Case I (left): Analysis of
permissions requested in manifest (Green = reduced declaration, Red = additional declaration, White = no change from unused, Grey = no change
from declared.) and Case II (right): Comparison of run-time permission access pattern (shades of green: percentage of reduced access & shades
of red: percentage of increased access). + and − symbols (left) and percent values (right) were added to support viewers with achromatopsia.
Reading example: App Accuweather (row 19). Case I: CALENDAR permission removed (green, −). MICROPHONE permission added (red, +),
PHONE permission removed (green, −). Case II: Number of LOCATION permissions showed: 100 percent less (green, −100), SENSORS permission
increased by 10% (light red, +10), SMS permission showing reduced by 6% (light green, −6).
6
periods. The quantification of app permission requests is
based on a three-level indicator.
A reduction of dangerous permissions declarations can
be observed. In total, we observe fewer dangerous permis-
sion requests in 44 incidents. For an overview, Fig. 3a shows
how individual apps have increased and decreased their
permission declaration. Moreover, this was also confirmed
in total changes shown in Fig. 4a where the reduction in
permission declaration is shown as blue columns. An app
category that has the highest reduction bar has a lower
data access potential, and thus be considered more privacy-
friendly. All app groups show a reduction of permission
declaration after the adoption of the GDPR.
With respect to category, visualization of change in
permission declaration is shown in Fig. 3a which depicts
that weather forecasting-related apps represent a significant
improvement in terms of requesting less dangerous permis-
sions, namely PHONE (6 incidents), CONTACTS (5 incidents)
and CALENDAR (4 incidents). Interestingly, this was also
confirmed in permission usage changes shown in Fig. 3b.
After Weather apps, both Fig. 4a and Fig. 4b confirm that
Music apps dominate the second best privacy performance.
Although the privacy performance of Fitness apps is better
than Social and Communication apps regarding the permis-
sion manifest changes, all the three categories were assigned
similar delta values for permission usage changes.
Our analysis shows that apps are less permission-hungry
when it comes to requesting permissions CALENDAR, SMS,
PHONE, CONTACTS and LOCATION. However, some of the
permissions were requested more excessively in post-GDPR
period: CAMERA (4 incidents), MICROPHONE (3 incidents)
and SENSORS (1 incident).
2.2 Permissions: Changes in use
In order to investigate hypothesis H2, we monitored apps’
use of dangerous permissions at run time. The first phase of
the data collection campaign was in March 2017, which
is referred to as the pre-GDPR period. We carried out the
second phase in December 2018 and it represents the post-
GDPR period. In this subsection, we discuss the changes
and other notable observations between the two collected
data sets.
In the pre-GDPR phase, apps showed dangerous per-
missions more frequently while idling than would be ex-
pected [5], [14]. We monitored several sets of popular apps
from different categories and their permission access pat-
terns while keeping the devices idle (without user interac-
tion). The apps were installed on several devices that had
a pre-configured prototype app (A-ware) installed to record
API access from the operating system. The collected logs
were then analyzed to determine apps permission access
patterns. Recently, we repeated the same experiment with a
post-GDPR app set installation.
The post-GDPR phase faced several obstacles; including
keeping the catalyst parameters for data collection intact
and finding an app-set that matches with the corresponding
data sets from independently conducted studies in two
different geographic locations (Sweden and Germany). In
order to reproduce the earlier collection context and to
keep the other influencing parameters constant, none of
the apps were actively used after installation. We collected
logs of their permission access patterns. Figure 3 shows a
correlation visualization of the permission data. Figure 3b
shows the comparison of the pre-GDPR and post-GDPR
permission usage data. The following changes in patterns
can be observed:
• In general, the frequent presence of green fields
in Fig. 3b indicates that many apps reduced their
permission access counts compared to the pre-GDPR
phase.
• Considering the area between K11 & T20, Weather
apps significantly reduced permission access and
YahooWeather(14) shows the most significant im-
provement. The area between O14–O20 also shows
reductions, as well as rows 8, 14, and 21.
• Music apps also reduced permission access
during idle time with one notable exception:
GooglePlayMusic(3) (see K3–T3: increasing
SENSOR & STORAGE access while reducing access
to the rest of permission groups.)
• Columns R & T indicate the overall increment in
accessing SENSOR & STORAGE permissions. Fitness,
Communication and Social apps are mainly responsi-
ble for such increase.
• Column O highlights the overall reduction of access
to LOCATION permission group with a couple of
exceptions: Fitness and Social apps have increased
access frequency.
• Line(43), WeChat(44), Imo(45),
Runtastic(28) and Pedometer(29) are the
five apps that increased idle time permission access
frequency compared to the pre-GDPR period.
Some noteworthy observations can be made by comparing
Fig. 3a to Fig. 3b:
• App 14 has both reduced its declared permissions in
the manifest and shows reduced use of the remaining
permissions. Apps 8 and 21 have reduced their use,
but only removed few of the dangerous permissions
from the manifest.
• The groups of social apps and communication apps
(rows 31–50) show a reduced idle permission use
pattern in columns K–P, however, they kept nearly
all dangerous permissions in their manifesto ready
to be used, as seen in columns C–J.
• While CAMERA and CONTACTS permissions are the
most-added post-GDPR permissions in the manifest
(column C–D), their idle use has strongly decreased
(column M–N).
• Both the permission requests for and the use of
PHONE (column G and Q) and SMS (column I and
S) have reduced in the post-GDPR data set.
3 CHANGES IN EXPRESSED USER CONCERNS
We collected a large number of user reviews from the
Google Play app market for both the pre- and post-GDPR
periods [7]. Applying text classification techniques, the goal
was to investigate how many privacy-related concerns can




































(b) Permission usage analysis
Fig. 4. A comparison of app permission declaration reductions and permission usage reductions from pre- to post GDPR periods. The blue columns
illustrate the magnitude of reduction of (a) permission declarations in manifests and (b) actual permission usage.
ultimately enable us to compare users attitudes towards
apps for both time frames. Thus, this section examines
hypothesis H3.
Based on the mobile app threat categorization in [7],
we processed, analyzed, and classified the collected user
reviews (before the adoption of the GDPR, in Nov 2017) as-
sociated with the top 50 most downloaded apps within five
app categories on the Google Play app market. As depicted
in Fig. 5, we detected 799 privacy complaints concerning
our app sets. When it comes to the most reported threats,
Targeted Ads, Spam and General have the biggest portion
with a share of 389, 136 and 105 complaints, respectively.
It is worth mentioning that the General category mostly con-
tains complaints regarding the over-privileged (permission
hungry) apps that are requesting irrelevant permissions to
their proper functionality. By contrast, Tracking & Spyware,
Phishing, and Unintended Data Disclosure comprise the lowest
number of complaints (16, 21, and 37 user reviews, respec-
tively). In terms of the most and the least reported app
categories, we can refer to Lifestyle (255 complaints) and
Music & Audio (120 complaints) respectively. Both categories
have Targeted Ads as the most reported threat. However, for
Lifestyle category, the second most reported threat is Spam
(62 complaints) and for Music & Audio it is Unauthorized
Charges (30 complaints).
In February 2019, we collected a new data set of user
reviews corresponding to the same app set to check the
privacy perception of mobile users after the GDPR came
into effect. Overall, a decent reduction can be observed
in the total number of privacy relevant complaints (from
799 to 704). As for the most reported threat, similar to the
pre-GDPR period, it involves complaints about Targeted Ads
(347). As opposed to the pre-GDPR period, General category
takes the second place with 130 complaints. In addition,
the third most reported threat is Spam (97 complaints). The
same scenario repeated for the least reported threats for
the post-GDPR period with some permutations: Phishing
(13 complaints), Unintended Data Disclosure (27 complaints),
Tracking & Spyware (27 complaints). In terms of the app
category with the maximum number of privacy complaints,
Lifestyle still dominates the biggest share (165 complaints).
In contrast to the pre-GDPR period where Music & Audio
had the lowest number of privacy relevant complaints, this
time it has the third biggest portion (150 complaints). The
minimum number of privacy relevant complaints are found
in Health & Fitness this time (113 complaints).
4 DISCUSSION OF OBSERVATIONS
We see an overall reduction in all three data sets that were
collected during the post-GDPR period:
• The declared intent to use permissions in the mani-
fest data shows a general reduction of the number of
permissions declared in the manifesto.
• There are substantially fewer permissions shown in
the post-GDPR data set that measured idling apps,
although some permissions are being used more
often.
• User concern expressed in the Google Play forum has
somewhat decreased for all app categories, except
for worries about targeted advertising and general
security concerns.
It is difficult to correlate the observed phenomena di-
rectly with the GDPR. In this section, we try to interpret the
results to find potential causes and explanations.
As shown in Fig. 3 and in Fig. 4, there is a significant
reduction in the number of permissions used by apps. At
first glance, we observe that the data minimization principle
may be more strongly followed by app developers in the
post-GDPR period. Such improvement in data minimiza-
tion is also directly connected to the purpose specification
principle as it requires developers to clarify the need for
requesting relevant permissions. As an important obser-
vation, we found that apps are greedier in requesting
sensor-related permissions (CAMERA, MICROPHONE, and
BODY_SENSOR) in the post-GDPR period. Our explanation
is that access to other permissions (CONTACTS, LOCATION,
and MICROPHONE) may have become conditional and is
triggered by motion sensors using SENSORS. Should there
be changes in SENSORS data, other permissions can be
invoked. We plan to investigate this phenomenon in future
experiments. A possible explanation for this may be the fact
that advertising content is shown more effectively when
users actually look at the screen. Consequently, apps may
use the sensors for motion, acceleration and bearing to










































































































































































Fig. 5. A set of graphs comparing numbers of privacy-related user reviews associated with different app categories in pre- and post-GDPR scenarios:
(a) business, (b) health & fitness, (c) lifestyle, (d) music & audio, and (e) tools.
in user location may express an increased trend towards
location-aware advertising.
We see a large number of declared permissions remain-
ing unused, particularly, in the communications and social
apps categories. What does this imply? This might point
to sleeping functionality that is not used in idling apps,
and could indicate that some apps deploy continuous and
invasive tactics to harvest more data (i.e. progressively col-
lecting consent for dangerous permissions after a period of
interaction). Such tactics have been observed and described
in the literature [15], [16]. However, it is hard to judge
whether this is the result of data minimization work, or of
malicious intent. To clarify this, a further study will have to
document apps efforts to collect partial consent in similar
ways as those documented in a report about nudging users
towards less privacy [17].
The significant reduction of permission declaration and
use in the weather app group is best explained with a large
amount of press and media attention spent on weather apps
that extract personal data. From 2017 to 2019, there were
frequent press stories in, for example The Times, the Wall
Street Journal and PC World, that exposed weather apps
greedy data collection and sharing practice. Such massive
negative publicity may have led to the re-engineering of the
weather apps for the simple reason of preventing further
negative public exposure.
The reduction of apps’ interest in the PHONE and SMS
permissions (see Sec. 2.2) may provide slightly more privacy
for those who use those communication channels, however,
the decrease may also point to a general decline in these
channels’ popularity and relevance. A decline in telecom
operators’ text messaging profits caused by chat and mes-
senger software is a well-established observation, with SMS
revenue dropping for the first time in 2014.
The user feedback shows a descending trend in the
total number of concerns voiced from the pre- to post-
GDPR periods. This is a somewhat puzzling fact, since
most of the global user population must have received
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a multitude of GDPR compliance messages, seen media
and press coverage about ‘spy apps’ and read news about
major data breaches. All these should increase the attention,
awareness, and wariness of consumers. However, it seems
that the expressed user concern actually declined. This is
evident for the Lifestyle category as the total number of
privacy relevant complaints decreased by 90. However, in
two cases we observed a gentle increase in the total number
of users’ complaints, namely Business and Music & Audio
categories. Both categories target users’ general interests
and are supposed to give certain relevant functionalities.
A closer look at the Business category shows a significant
increase in the reporting of General threats in the post-GDPR
period (almost twice as many). The same also happened to
Music Audio where Targeted Ads were reported more than
twice as often in the post-GDPR period.
A probable cause remains unexplored in this work,
which is the possibility of establishing formal channels by
companies to handle individual privacy-related complaints
from the user. Therefore, the reduction of user complaints
in public forums may not be able to adjudicate proper as-
sessment of the real situation. Furthermore, implementation
of GDPR has compelled many companies to provide several
privacy notices and transparent services to the data subject
(i.e. ability to see, download and modify data stored by the
corresponding service provider), which may cause the user
to be annoyed and reluctant in this regard respectively.
One possible interpretation of this result is the capac-
ity and effect of software to establish de-facto laws and
principles ignoring or bypassing regulation, see page 466
in [10]. The practices of the information industry may have
constituted a precedence widely accepted by consumers, in
spite of regulation. Another interpretation is that consumers
may not really notice the subtle changes in post-GDPR app
behavior. Previous research in human-computer interaction
has shown that the permission-based access control models’
consequences and implications are mostly incomprehensi-
ble to end-users [13], who may seldom have first-hand-
experience with negative privacy impact.
5 CONCLUSION
In our data, we have seen changes in app behavior and
in user feedback that point towards the positive impact of
the GDPR on apps. The number of permissions demanded
in app manifestos has somewhat declined (H1 confirmed),
with the strongest decline in the weather app group. Idling
apps seem to use fewer of the permissions than they are
actually prepared to use, with observed reduction in per-
mission use (H2 confirmed). In user feedback, a moderate
decline in concerns related to privacy can be seen, though
awareness and worries about targeted advertising seem to
have increased. This is an overall confirmation of H3.
Apps seem to have become more interested in sensor
data and location, as well as memory access. However, they
still have the capacity to use other dangerous permissions
and may just not yet use them while the app lacks the
expected degree of interaction.
We speculated about reasons for our observations in
section 4. Some apps may have undergone re-engineering
for better privacy. Other apps may have moved their use of
certain permissions where there is interaction with users,
and where apps are actively being used, measurable by
sensor input. Our findings are inconclusive concerning our
expectation that regulatory compliance would show in app
behavior and experience. The user feedback results are
showing that consumers seem the most worried about tar-
geted advertising, both before and after the GDPR came into
effect.
Possibly the compliance process has not led to a reduc-
tion in the number of permissions used, but it may have
changed privacy policies and the ways in which permission
consent is obtained from the app users.
Overall, we conclude that app privacy has moderately
improved after the GDPR was implemented.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The work presented in this article is partially funded
by the ALerT project, Research Council of Norway, IK-
TPLUSS 2017-2021 and by the European Union Horizon
2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie
Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 675730 Privacy&Us.
REFERENCES
[1] “Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation),”
Off J Eur Union, p. L119, 2016.
[2] J. P. Albrecht, “How the GDPR will change the world,” Eur. Data
Prot. L. Rev., vol. 2, p. 287, 2016.
[3] Dangerous permissions, Accessed on 27-Jan-2019. [Online]. Avail-
able: https://developer.android.com/guide/topics/permissions/
overview#dangerous permissions
[4] N. Momen, “Towards measuring apps’ privacy-friendliness (licen-
tiate dissertation),” Karlstad University, Department of Mathemat-
ics and Computer Science, Tech. Rep. 2018:31, 2018.
[5] N. Momen, T. Pulls, L. Fritsch, and S. Lindskog, “How much
privilege does an app need? investigating resource usage of
android apps (short paper),” in 2017 15th Annual Conference on
Privacy, Security and Trust (PST), Aug 2017, pp. 268–2685. [Online].
Available: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8476943
[6] A. Carlsson, C. Pedersen, F. Persson, and G. Söderlund,
“Kaudroid: A tool that will spy on applications and how they spy
on their users,” Karlstad University, Department of Mathematics
and Computer Science, Tech. Rep., 2018. [Online]. Available:
http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kau:diva-66090
[7] M. Hatamian, J. Serna, and K. Rannenberg, “Revealing the
unrevealed: Mining smartphone users privacy perception on app
markets,” Computers & Security, 2019. [Online]. Available: http://
www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167404818313051
[8] D. Barrera, H. G. Kayacik, P. C. van Oorschot, and A. Somayaji, “A
methodology for empirical analysis of permission-based security
models and its application to android,” in Proceedings of the 17th
ACM conference on Computer and communications security. ACM,
Conference Proceedings, pp. 73–84.
[9] M. Hatamian, J. Serna, K. Rannenberg, and B. Igler, “Fair: Fuzzy
alarming index rule for privacy analysis in smartphone apps,” in
Trust, Privacy and Security in Digital Business, J. Lopez, S. Fischer-
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